Preface/History: I started this post about 2 and a half weeks ago, but when Veterans Day came up, I braced myself for a triggering time. But the day went well and things were good. The next day however, was really low and triggering to boot. Remember this number, it is a black magic number. This number is 23. Reading this book took much out of me spiritually, emotionally and historically. Just trying to think to articulate and emote what I was going to express became palpably disabling. So I had to put it down and let it simmer some more. But then I brushed the dirt off… something told me to Get up and Try again… So now its time to pick-up, and CHARLIE MIKE (Continue Mission)
I always knew that I would be in the military, even at a kindergarten age. By the age of eight in 1973 I was reading about Irwin Rommel
“The Desert Fox”, as well as the battles of Stalingrad
I watched war movies incessantly and I was very dramatic as well as studious about it. My father even took me to the Armour/Tank Museum at Aberdeen Proving Ground. At the same time though, what I saw as a very young boy in the Bronx
at this age and this historical context, was a lot less sterile and apathetic than as it is today. The anti-war movement was the boots on the ground in my neighborhood, as well as the cultural the fallout attributed to it. Additionally, there was alot of youth gangs and drugs, after all we are talking about the Bronx here in the late sixties and early seventies.
The young adults at this time, were in full swing, from the shoes they wore to the clothes. It was mixture of hippie garb as well as many of the guys would be sporting this type of clothing and also peace signs etc. Growing up was messed up in a lot of ways, and by the time I hit 18 years of age the trajectory of my life ensured that by now I had to make a decision. College was not working out, and I had just seen Meatballs (don’t laugh please), and I also had just read a book about some friends that joined the Army National Guard as well as the classic 13th Valley which should be essential reading for all officers and NCOs. I reached out to the local Army Guard recruiter because I was hell bent on being in Armour or at the very least mechanized infantry. So here I am, 18 years old talking with the recruiter just asking stupid questions like “Which MOS carries the Flame Thrower”. So my discussion with the recruiter is getting pretty serious, like I am about to make a commitment by signing on the dotted line and my father, whom had accompanied me to the recruiter says to me “lets go outside for a moment”, and so we take a quick detour out front, and my pop lays down the scene on the reality of what being in a tank crew is going to be like, especially in the winter in Germany.
So in the end, I ended up in the New York Air National Guard (NYANG). My unit was a Combat Communications Unit, I found that at least at the time in early (1980s), that it was an organizational culture that was really not for me, mainly because everyone in my Unit was somehow professionally involved in Law Enforcement full-time and that is not the way I wanted to go. Nassau Community College was not working out for me, service sector jobs only, living under my parents roof was not my thing. Again, it was time for me to part ways and go it alone. So… in 1985… I went active duty and never looked back. My first assignment of choice, I might add, was 5th Combat
Communications. Don’t ask me why or how, but I am very proud of my legacy of tactical communications/first responders in the 5th and 27th CS/Theater Deployable Communications. My active duty career ended in May of 2005, a total of 22 years. In those 22 years I find it rather surreal how many military professionals both enlisted and commissioned are not very literate or cognizant of history in general let alone politics or foreign policy. Yet, another thing about me, no matter how much I love the military, I would never carry out acts of war that were immoral no matter what the cost. I knew this in my heart, soul, and mind.
I have been retired now for almost a decade, and now I am sizing-up, appreciating and putting into historical context what my military career, meant and how this nations historical currents tried to sweep me along with the detritus of our nation’s penchant to unsheathe the “Sword of Saint Michael” just more than a little too quickly than it should. I cannot look at this spread out on the canvas of my life and not be deeply affected and consumed. It’s time for all of us veterans, soldiers, sailors, airman, marines and coast-guardsman to think a lot more critically of how we do business foreign policy wise and stand up.
For those of you still in uniform that are officers or Senior NCOs, the job ain’t over when you get out. It’s not just about some contractor six figure position. It’s about being active in the national discussion, being a stalwart mentor and organizer to the people in your communities.
I came upon “Breach of Trust” in the Veteran’s Affairs Community Based Outreach Clinic (CBOC), over here in Tinton Falls, NJ, while I was reading a magazine in the waiting room. I had never heard of Mr. Bacevich nor any of his writings. I had started “Breach of Trust” sometime earlier this year, but ended up having to put it on the backburner due to the necessity of focusing on my last semester of school. So, when I started back in on finishing it up, I could not believe again, how concise, yet direct and straight to the heart Mr. Bacevich’s writing is. But even, more importantly, Mr. Bacevich is a man of impeccable integrity, and the way he expresses it, shines so bright it blinds you.
Mr. Bacevich has been written about extensively in the press and various reviews that he considers himself to be a “conservative catholic” and I know he has been on Amy Goodman’s highly praised Democracy Now program, but unabashedly going into this I did not know much more about the man other than a few even more interesting things about this author, that has been said to be man of staunch integrity.
From the get go, lets start off stating that the first 2-3 chapters give some amazing historical background of historical slices of time when Americans did have a stake in the game in varying shades or degrees to some extent, especially during both World War(s) I and II as well as Vietnam. Some of these historical backgrounds I have experienced directly. When I came in, which was in 1985 things were pretty crazy, and funding started to flow, during the Reagan and Bush era. I witnessed collateral institutionalized racism and the remnants of Jim Crow, I have seen the role and progress of my female and LBGQT comrades in arms progress through almost an aggegrate of three decades time, and I have always tried to educate myself as much as I can historically on all facets of military history.
But where I really start to embark on this review is on a point early in the book that stood out to me and has me stink me thinking intensely on it, and I am still not sure how to process and feel about it.
President Roosevelt and General Marshall devised the main National War Fighting Strategy in World War II, we most purposely let the Russians take the most horrific cost in lives against the Germans. More than any other country in the War.
“Estimates of Soviet battle losses, for example, range between eleven and thirteen million. 16 Add civilian deaths— ten million or more in the Soviet Union, a mere handful in the United States— and the disparity becomes that much greater. To ascribe this to the fortunes of war is to deny Roosevelt credit that is rightly his.”
– Bacevich, Andrew. Metropolitan Books; reprint edition (September 10, 2013), 0805082964., pg. 24
Many Americans when presented with these concrete facts cannot process them at all from a military or historical standpoint. Why?
“Many factors account for that disproportion, but among them were calculated choices made by FDR and his principal advisers: give the Russians whatever they needed to kill and be killed fighting Germans; engage the Wehrmacht directly in large -scale ground combat only after it had been badly weakened; and fight the Japanese on terms that played to American advantages , expending matériel on a vast scale in order to husband lives. “Our standard of living in peace,” General Marshall had declared in September 1939, “is in reality the criterion of our ability to kill and destroy in war,” adding that “present-day warfare is simply mass killing and mass destruction by means of machines resulting from mass production.” The unspoken corollary was this: the mass production of machines to wage war could enhance the American standard of living in the peace to follow. A preference for expending machines rather than men could— and did— produce strikingly positive effects on the home front.”
– Ibid, pg. 24-25
Depending on which side of the glass you percieve it, it may seem easy to be somewhat opposed to this rather brilliant national defensive strategy and whether it leaves you with a bitter taste in your mouth historically. FDR and General Marshall’s strategy was ultimately, in the end brilliant and poised, in my opinion, regardless of the ethical fallout perhaps? FDR was a pragmatist and General Marshall in many ways laid the concrete slab for the evolution of what was to become the European Union. These two carried out hugely monumental decisions, but at the same time, I wonder if even World War I our only goal was to be the “Pimp” in the pimp my War reality show? It’s like our national War Strategy was to baknroll as much of it as we could, in order not to get our hands bloody and spill American Blood. American Capital and it’s penchant for War. They both Walk hand in hand down the road to prosperity and economic stability, it flows through America’s Political elite regardless of Party. In reality I am frightened to say it, but perhaps it runs through all of our veins including my own. Perhaps, we don’t know how to rid ourselves… to rid ourselves of this toxicity. I have been looking high and low for answers but I have not found them yet.
Following this upacking of FDR’s World War II overall strategy, we will examine the quotes from the various chapters that I have found to be of critical importance, however your mileage may very, and to be honest I could have missed or incorrectly understood some underlying themes. Or you could outright think I am completely adrift in a sea of ignorance and stupdity. Thats what freedom of speech and expression are all about. So lets, get our review on.
Bacevich touches on many issues in the book, but it boils down to two main points.
The first point is abstraction, basically the American military (The Warrior Ethos), has been very carefully groomed to be an abstract concept within our national consciousness. The way or road that this took is via Nixon’s abolished the draft in 1968, and even more so ironically that in a way strides in areas of sexuality, gender, and race are nothing to balk at, but in the ending of the draft coupled with these social progressions with the Armed Forces were the final nail in the coffin to completely abstract the concept of the War Fighter in the American psyche. For each giant social step forward, it seems like we made our own price to pay and took two step back.
In my mind’s eye, its seems strange that it would a President as infamous and conservative as Nixon. Originally, I felt that the ending the draft was somehow in a way a good thing. But now I do agree with Mr. Bacevich. But we both do so just merely in the singular argument of re-implementing the draft. I also will give you a palpable example of how the role of National Service works in other societies. In Israel EVERYONE and I mean everyone has a commitment to service, and a high likelihood that you will be in the IDF.
From Bacevich’s point of view, we (Vets/Military Folk) are the 1%, and from Redcon1 Music Groups, point of view, we are not assimilated. We are the real 1%, the other 1%. The one percent that caused the great recession (sic) of 2008, and not a single one was prosecuted , they rode on our backs when it was convenient for them.
“As the bumper sticker proclaims, freedom isn’t free. Conditioned to believe that the exercise of global leadership is essential to preserving their freedom, and further conditioned to believe that leadership best expresses itself in the wielding of military might, Americans have begun to discover that trusting in the present-day American way of war to preserve the present-day American way of life entails exorbitant and unexpected costs. Yet as painful as they may be, these costs represent something far more disturbing. As a remedy for all the ailments afflicting the body politic, war at least as Americans have chosen to wage it turns out to be a fundamentally inappropriate prescription. Rather than restoring the patient to health, war (as currently practiced pursuant to freedom as currently defined) constitutes a form of prolonged ritual suicide. Rather than building muscle, it corrupts and putrefies.”
– Ibid, p 43-44
“Hitherto a blight laid at the feet of men, war is becoming an activity that allows women a full share in the bloodletting, this constituting, in the words of one Washington Post columnist, “the painful and real price of true equality.””
– Ibid, p 72
“The conversion of military service from collective obligation to personal preference was now complete and irrevocable.”
– Ibid, p 79
“Finally, what endowed this approach with a semblance of plausibility was a belief in the transformative implications of information technology. The onset of the 1990s marked the flowering of the Information Age. Americans were falling in love with the Network. So, too, was the Pentagon. The army, Sullivan asserted, was “on the leading edge of the revolution in military affairs.” Information acquiring it, analyzing it, sharing it held “the key to a vast improvement in effectiveness.” Information was making it possible to apply force more rapidly and with greater precision. Job one in any conflict was to “win the information war,” thereby enabling army forces “to apply power to the main effort quickly, to attack the enemy simultaneously throughout the battle area, and to do it over and over again, allowing him no time to react, recover, or regroup.”
– Ibid, p 89-90
As my Air Force Specialty Code was 291X1, 491X1, and finally 3C0X1. I went from using Teletypes, to Keypunch, to magtapes, to JWICs installs. But my commentary on this section could lengthen this post considerably larger than it already is so that is a separate post unto itself.
"As any car salesman will tell you, careful selection and sculpting determine which facts count and which don’t. So sustaining the claim, for instance, that in 1991 U.S. ground forces had defeated “the fourth largest army in the world in 100 hours” meant overlooking the several weeks of uncontested aerial bombardment to which Iraqi forces were subjected before the coalition ground attack began. Similarly, to keep the WORLD’S BEST ARMY bumper sticker unbesmirched, it helped to ignore the ignominious spanking of a ranger task force administered by a Somali warlord in 1993. Tagging civilian policy makers with the blame for the disastrous “Blackhawk Down” firefight in Mogadishu rendered that episode irrelevant except as a testament to the gallantry of American soldiers.”
– Ibid, p 92
“The problem with depicting Operation Desert Storm as a “100-hour war” was not only that it ignored the bombing campaign that preceded the action on the ground. Of equal or greater importance was the fact that the war didn’t really end when President George H. W. Bush ordered coalition forces to cease operations against Iraq’s battered army. Operation Desert Storm settled very little, while leaving much unsettled. Given the strategic and political complications that ensued, the storied campaign of 1991 turned out to be merely the opening phase of a much longer and far more costly struggle. All of this appears blindingly obvious in retrospect. Whether historians ultimately classify U.S. military involvement in Iraq as a stand-alone event (a war for the Persian Gulf) or whether they situate it in a larger context (one part of the so-called Global War on Terrorism), the accompanying dates won’t be those of Operation Desert Storm (January 17, 1991– February 28, 1991). Instead, that campaign signaled the firing of the first shots in a war destined to continue for two decades.”
Yes indeed. Same lies, same false bravado, just served with different falacies.
– Ibid, p 93
“In 2011 some twenty years after Operation Desert Storm President Obama spoke of U.S. forces leaving Iraq “with their heads held high, proud of their success, and knowing that the American people stand united in our support for our troops.” But success in this instance had become hardly more than a euphemism for the avoidance of utter defeat. Apart from a handful of deluded neoconservatives, no one believes that the United States accomplished its objectives in Iraq, unless the main objective was to commit mayhem, apply a tourniquet to staunch the bleeding, and then declare the patient stable while hastily leaving the scene of the crime.”
– Ibid, p 94
“What if the effect of projecting U.S. military power was not to solve problems but to exacerbate them? What if expectations of doing more with less proved hollow? What consequences would then ensue? Who would bear them?”
– Ibid, p 95
Many American Mothers, Fathers, Sisters, and Brothers have zero idea of what we have gone through over the past 14 years, but more importantly the price we paid and what kind of prices our families paid. Even more importantly, the military dependent children that have grown up through the past decade.
“The answers to these questions, their very existence unacknowledged prior to 9/11—became apparent soon after President George W. Bush committed U.S. ground forces to Afghanistan and then Iraq. Granted, the army that deployed into these war zones was not Force XXI come to fruition a full decade after Desert Storm, that concept was still more PowerPoint presentation than reality. In pursuit of a paradigm that emphasized flexibility and agility, the army had moved at a glacial pace.”
– Ibid, p 95
“Most ambitious of all was the army’s Future Combat Systems (FCS) program, conceived in 1995 with an eye to creating a “family” of “weapons, drones, robots, sensors and hybrid -electric combat vehicles connected by a wireless network.” 48 By the time FCS met its demise in 2009, the cost to the American taxpayer exceeded $18 billion.”
I physically was employed at Fort Monmouth, in direct support as a sub-contractor doing information security technical consulting and had direct interaction with FCS. I will go any further into that.
– Ibid, p 96
“No one believed more strongly that information technology was revolutionizing warfare than Donald Rumsfeld. When he became secretary of defense in January 2001, he was fired by the conviction that the armed forces were acting too slowly in capitalizing on this revolution. As the Pentagon’s maximum leader, he aimed to fix that. The word devised to describe this project was transformation. The events of 9/ 11 provided Rumsfeld with a ready-made opportunity to advance his agenda. During the 1990s, the varied, small-scale contingencies of OOTW had kept the services busy. In terms of scope and importance, the Global War on Terrorism promised to be something altogether different.”
– Ibid, p 96
“In its own eyes, the army had been girding for just such a test throughout the previous decade. Yet despite concerted efforts to refashion itself into a war-winning power-projection force, the army did not qualify as Rumsfeld’s favorite service. In the secretary’s eyes, words like nimble and smart conjured up images of satellite-guided air weapons delivered in support of gizmo-toting commandos. The army might talk the talk, but it didn’t walk the walk. Much like the Crusader artillery system, it still came across as a lumbering behemoth more yesterday than tomorrow. The problem, in his estimation, began at the top, the secretary of defense telling a subordinate (apparently in jest) that “lining up fifty of its generals in the Pentagon and gunning them down” would be just the thing to get the army moving in the right direction. One of those generals was Eric Shinseki. Army chief of staff in 2001, he believed that the solution to the army’s Rumsfeld problem was to get with Rumsfeld’s program. “If you dislike change ,” he warned his fellow officers, “you’re going to dislike irrelevance even more.” But Shinseki could never convince Rumsfeld that the army was committed to transformation—perhaps because it wasn’t, at least not as Rumsfeld understood the term.”
– Ibid, p 97
“So the nation did not mobilize. Congress did not raise taxes, curtail consumption, or otherwise adjust domestic priorities to accommodate wartime requirements. That a state undertaking what it explicitly called global war might consider reinstituting conscription was too far-fetched even to contemplate. The implicit assumption shared in military and civilian quarters alike was that existing U.S. military capacity was more than ample for the paltry tasks at hand. That the initial U.S. intervention in Afghanistan in October 2001, with a relative handful of troops and CIA agents supported by sophisticated airpower, overthrew the Taliban in a matter of weeks seemed to affirm this assumption. The implications appeared incontrovertible: the unsurpassed quality of U.S. forces made it unnecessary even to consider questions of quantity. Shinseki, however, began to have second thoughts about this consensus. Yet when he expressed them thereby confirming Rumsfeld’s view that the army’s top leaders were incorrigible his concern was not with war’s conduct but with its aftermath. In the run-up to the invasion of Iraq, the general testified before Congress that occupation was almost certain to require more U.S. troops than would conquest. Here, he predicted, was one task where the do-more-better-with-less formula was not going to apply.”
– Ibid, p 98-99
“It did nothing to slow the Bush administration’s rush to invade Iraq, in part because Rumsfeld didn’t need the army chief of staff’s consent and wasn’t about to court his approval. Besides, the secretary of defense had already identified another army general willing to do his bidding. This was Tommy Franks, head of U.S. Central Command, and as such the officer immediately responsible for the ongoing war in Afghanistan and the forthcoming one in Iraq.”
– Ibid, p 99
“Yet Franks erred on two counts. His lesser error was to claim more credit than was his due. In fact, his “revolutionary concept” recycled the very same clichés that generals had been reciting ever since Operation Desert Storm. His greater error was to insist that his revolutionary concept had, indeed, yielded a historic triumph, satisfying the standard that Sullivan had set a decade earlier: decisive victory achieved with a “minimal expenditure of national wealth and resources.” The first error unseemly braggadocio spoke ill of the man. The second error, which ultimately proved fatal to Franks’s reputation (and Rumsfeld’s), had far more significant implications for the army and the United States. Rather than marking the end of a short war, the overthrow of Saddam Hussein inaugurated a long one.”
I find it obscenely comedic that I received an autographed copy of General Frank’s Autobiography when we met for a family dinner in the city back around 2007, sadly I never got to read the tome and elected to give it to a friend of mine. During my deployment to Al Udeid Air Base from November 2002 to July 2003 with the 379th Air Expeditionary Communications Squadron, my troops and I installed a Cisco 3524 switch exclusively into his tent for quick access to NIPR and SIPR connectivity. When my SSgt and troops had returned from actually doing the physical install they happened to be in the tent when his adjutant was there and he told me the experience was pretty surreal. I have on numerous occasions presented and sat in discussions directly with 1-3 Generals in my career at times, and of course being a General has it benefits and perks to a degree. But I can remember the Commander at Aviano when I was stationed there, General Dan Leaf, this leader would personally make it a point to personally stop and chat with his folks in the commissary line, at the cashiers cage etc. But he could also lead, and also tear ass when the need arose. Nothing really more needs to said about that. As humans, and possibly as formally educated military professional officers these men/women in these position can sometimes lose sight of the big picture when it comes to leadership, and a big portion of leadership is humaneness, humility, and humbleness and to keep them the three Hs at appropriate levels even when you are at the pinnacle of leadership positions regardless of the context. Ultimately, what happens is that in some extraordinary historical circumstances, some leaaders can become horribly deluded by what they believe with their senses. I do not believe that Tommy Franks was a Hegelian by any stretch of the imagination, nor historical materialism, I think these concepts could have grounded this man, in times of duress.
– Ibid, p 100-101
“Military professionals have mistaken citizen soldiers for their enemies. This tendency was especially pronounced after Vietnam. In fact, the citizen-soldier is the professional’s truest ally. The enemy of the military ideal that Theodore Westhusing sought to preserve is unbridled ambition on Washington’s part, expressing itself in an affinity for imperial adventurism that engenders massive corruption, while the American people sit idly by. Iraq was a case in point. Afghanistan is another. Reinstitute a military system that mandates shared sacrifice people’s war and you’ll have either fewer wars or the means to create a larger army. Either way, military professionals win.”
This is where it got disabling for me for a few days. Bacevich takes the reader down the dark and disturbing story of the death of Col. Westhusing, United States Army. On Veterans day, I published a short and respectful post honoring his death, stating just as Bacevich had, that he is to be honored and revered. A true patriot and hero. I have close to 700 connections on LinkedIn. Many, of the colleague/connections if you will, are Light Birds or above as well as my Senior NCO peers. I expected a response, a neuron would fire off. An argument or flamewar. Nothing, zero, zip. All quiet on the western front. I was not sure what I expected (this is my problem in the first place isn’t it). Not one person said anything.
The above video speaks volumes of the emotional state I was in, after I watched this and this man was a direct subordinate to General Petraeus.
Col. Ted Westhusing is the manifestion physically of what it means to be a person of Integrity for this nation. He is not, and will not be a Footnote in the annals of this dark period of Americas historical narrative.
Are we afraid to speak the truth? Is it denial? Is it that you have succumbed? Given in to the sweet and noxious slumber that false security brings within the climate of fear that was birthed on September 11, 2001?
Are you afraid to lose your six-figure plus salaried income that you have coming from your defense contractor job? You do not have to be radicalized to speak out, at least the first cold war is over, and say what truly needs to be said or do you truly just not care!
“What led up to Operation Desert Storm, Khobar Towers, and a host of other terrorist attacks upons Americans.”
– Ibid, p 137
“Those who sit at the high table of American intellectual life pride themselves on their capacity to detect inconsistencies, contradictions, and hypocrisy. Yet that instinct does not encompass the nation’s military system or the relationship between the military and society. There, complacency reigns. The prospect of a particular war may arouse attention, but Washington’s penchant for war more generally largely escapes notice. So do the assumptions, ambitions, and arrangements especially relating to the issue of who serves and sacrifices which under-gird that penchant.”
– Ibid, p 138
“Yet ideas frame the environment in which statesmen interpret circumstances and justify their decisions. Out of the clash of theory and opinion, whether advanced by sober academics or inflammatory talk show hosts, come cues that policy makers consciously exploit or to which they subconsciously respond. Barack Obama did not invent the Obama Doctrine of counterterrorism any more than Bill Clinton invented the Clinton Doctrine of humanitarian intervention or George W. Bush the Bush Doctrine of preventive war. In each case, a president was merely adopting a concept that others had already devised, vetted, and promoted. So it is no small thing that leading members of America’s chattering classes find nothing objectionable in the way Washington parcels out responsibility for fighting the nation’s wars. When it comes to military matters, what intellectuals care about is not how America raises its armed forces but when, where, and how to employ them.”
Maybe this is exactly the problem, every citizen has a right to have a voice directly and concretely in where and how this Nation employs it armed forces, the populace en masse has legal reight to restrain the upper echelons at the apex of income quin-tile ladder and their penchant for war in order to ensure the preservation of this great nation in a sane, stable and truly secure manner.
– Ibid, p 139
“Was the main problem simply incompetence on the part of George W. Bush, his advisers, and his generals a splendid initiative squandered through faulty implementation? Or did failure derive from deeper causes, perhaps a fundamental misunderstanding of war or history or human nature itself? Or could the problem lie, at least in part, with a perversely undemocratic military system that condemned soldiers to waging something like perpetual war at the behest of a small coterie of Washington insiders, while citizens passively observed from a safe distance?”
A very close friend of mine that is an Italian citizen make a bad decision and dropped out of HS in his senior year. Immediately, he was in the Italian Army, specifically an artillery unit. In the German Democratic Republic, if someone is a conscientious object for religious, spiritual or ethical reasons, then then will work in another sector of the society of that country, something in public works, mail service, forestry, fire fighting etc. It’s really not that hard. I would like to even expand upon Mr. Bacevich’s argument about “Skin in the game”, see I don’t think it’s only about “Military Service”. It is about National Service, and the the abstraction of that idea in and of itself.
When someone enlists in a branch of the United States Armed Forces, they take an an oath, and for me personally at times (especially lately) it is a one of the most important oaths I have ever overtly and to this nation taken aloud, exactly at 5 different times in my life. From the young naive age of 19 to the age of 40, I had varying emotional and “intellectual” internalization’s of this Oath and how I carried myself and completed the Mission. But now, a decade later you come to realize it meant so much than that, at least to me. This is why there is a problem, because there is only 1 percent of us fighting or carrying out the national policy, and actively participating in truly horrific sacrifices for the “American” way of life and the “American” addiction to convenience, at any costs. I know additionally in Air Force Core Values, we spoke of Integrity in all our actions, at the senior Leadership level you must remember this and even more so when you retire, it isn’t over.
People, often talk of the stress involved with being downrange, but what also happened as well, at the Garrison and base level globally the mission goes on and Senior NCOs are forced more and more to deal with a grueling Ops Tempo and dwindled to none resources. To include training and human resources.
These last seven words of the last quotation, are what has become a malignant tumor that has been metastasizing since at least a century in the collective selective memory of this Nation.
Many, many of you sat apathetically and passively and continue to echo hollow trite hallow sentiments (eg. Thank you for your service), while the nations youngest two generations of Veterans are literally bleeding out.
– Ibid, p 148
“The all volunteer force is not a blessing. It has become a blight. Americans can, of course, choose to pretend otherwise, but those choosing such a course cannot be said to love their country. Nor can they be said to care about the well-being of those sent to fight on the country’s behalf.”
– Ibid, p 196
The very last sentence of the book is a condemnation of those in America that continue to live in denial, and exploit those that are willing to protect and defend this nation. So… you really don’t care about my country, and you made billions of dollars in an immoral war, then are only two things that we can define you as. These two things are academic, and correct nouns, but I am not going to tell you what they are. They will be left off of the this page. But socially sometimes leaders make mi-steps and then fail to tragic timing of historical forces converging with a country’s populace and culture due to this grave national mis-steps. But these individuals are never held accountable are they. After all everyone has been through, no one is even brought before a court. Please, explain it to me.
As I finish up this piece, we are less than 10 days from the initial release of the CIA Torture Report, and there are tens of thousands marching through the streets to protest directly against a system that only works for “them”. I was born in May of 1964, this is when President Lyndon B. Johnson signed into law the Civil Rights Act.
In 2007 in Balad, Iraq 1st Lt. Andrew J. Bacevich was killed in action, this is Andrew Bacevich’s son. Mr. Bacevich himself is a veteran commissioned officer of the Vietnam war and also was a West Point Instructor.
Mr. Bacevich, taught at Pardee School of Global Studies professor of international relations and history professor at the College of Arts & Sciences at Boston University, until August of 2014 when he retired at the age of 67.
As I now as finish up writing this less than a week ago, two of Italy’s biggest trade Unions went into to the streets head to head against police and scabs in the city Rome,
lashing out at the Economic plan laid out by their new PM Matteo Renzo. The Italian’s DO NOT have the easy street of just giving of and NOT FIGHTING IT OUT. Here in at home, the war is won that is being waged upon our citizens at this, point. It really does come to that. When will everything you see around you that is going on right in front of your eyes this very moment in the United States of America, rouse you from your long slumber of denial? Where will you draw your line of unacceptability?
Notes: For all of you Armour nerds be sure to check out the AHN Channel’s Greatest Tank Battles
Note1: Be sure to check out Soldier Hard and Redcon1 music group, run by Veterans for Veterans.
Note2: Starting next epic post we will start covering programming, security books, as well as other surprises.
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